Cuba has never participated in UN peacekeeping operations. Without a doubt, Cuba is one of the most controversial countries in the world. The country has survived more than 40 years of US sanctions intended to topple the government of Fidel Castro (BBC 2006m, par. 1). It also defied predictions that it would not survive the collapse of its one-time supporter, the Soviet Union (Ibid.). These two elements combined have created unique political conditions that have been highly criticized by some, and acclaimed by others.
With regards to peace operations, the United Nations conducted UNAVEM I to verify the phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of Angola (UN 2000a, par. 1). The withdrawal was completed by May 1991 (Ibid.). On June 6, the Secretary-General reported to the Security Council that UNAVEM I had carried out, fully and effectively, the mandate entrusted to it (Ibid.).
Initial variables of the data collection process:
UN/UN peacekeeping policy reform
Cuba has hosted the summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (EIU 2006bi, 1).
Perception of peacekeeping
Cuba has called on United Nations peacekeeping forces to stay strictly within their mandate—including respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other Countries (Radio Havana 1999, par. 1). During a 1999 session of the Special UN Committee on Peacekeeping Forces, held at the UN headquarters in New York City, Cuba's ambassador to the world body, Rafael Dausa, stated:
The so-called "blue helmets"—deployed in numerous countries around the world–must act in accordance with the United Nations Charter. Cuba's representative before the UN said that such peacekeeping troops should be carefully selected and must respect the territorial integrity and political independence of countries where they are deployed. Dausa added that the use of UN peacekeeping forces should not be considered as a solution to conflicts, nor should they be used as a substitute for negotiations or other ways to avoid potential conflicts. (Ibid., par. 2 quoting Dausa 1999)
Domestic political environment
The handover of power from Fidel Castro to his brother and vice-president, Raúl, has begun the process of succession (EIU 2006bi, 1). Political and economic change is expected within the existing political system, with continued hostile relations with the US limiting the possibility for an easing of US sanctions (Ibid.). This will not change the fact that Cuba does not provide troops to UN peacekeeping operations. If Cuba ever participates, Cuba would participate with medical units.
The handover of power from Fidel Castro to his brother and vice-president, Raúl, has begun the process of succession (EIU 2006bi, 1). Political and economic change is expected within the existing political system, with continued hostile relations with the US limiting the possibility for an easing of US sanctions (Ibid.). This will not change the fact that Cuba does not provide troops to UN peacekeeping operations. If Cuba ever participates, Cuba would participate with medical units.
Fidel Castro stepped down temporarily for health reasons, and has handed over to his brother and deputy, Raúl, and a team of successors (Ibid.). New ministers of communications and transport have been appointed (Ibid.). Dissidents have kept a low profile (Ibid.).
Domestic economic environment
Old engines of growth have weakened, and new ones have emerged (Ibid., 3). Labor productivity has increased, but remains low in many sectors (Ibid.). The structure of employment has shifted towards services (Ibid.). Agricultural output has been favored by improved climatic conditions (Ibid.). Tourism has ceased to be the main engine of growth (Ibid.).
Military affairs
Military leaders play an important political role, and occupy several ministerial posts in civilian sectors, including sugar, tourism, fisheries and transport (EIU 2006l, 15). The armed forces have become increasingly involved in business activities, including farming, tourism and manufacturing (Ibid.). These businesses led the development of enterprise reforms during the 1990s, moving away from centralized state direction towards greater autonomy, efficiency and market-orientation (Ibid.). They also built a reputation for tight managerial and accounting controls (Ibid.).
The main military threat is considered to be a potential US invasion (Ibid.).
Conscious that it would be unable to resist a US invading force for long, Cuba’s national defence strategy rests heavily on deterrence by seeking to show that invasion would have a high cost. A force of around 1m civilians, the territorial militia, is trained to resist occupation, and military exercises involve the whole population; the largest of these for many years was staged in late 2004. The state security apparatus is extensive, including a network of informers. In line with its policy of deterrence, one of the objectives of Cuba’s active international diplomacy is to maximize the political cost to the US of invasion. (Ibid.)
Foreign policy
Cuba’s foreign policy adheres to the basic principles of the international law: respect to the states’ sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity; peoples’ self-determination; the equality of states and peoples; rejection to the interference in the states’ internal affairs; the right to international cooperation, equitable and mutual; the pacific relations between the states, and other principles consecrated in the Letter of the United Nations (MRE-Cuba 2006, par. 1). Thus, peacekeeping is seen as interference in a state’s internal affairs. The internationalism, the anti-imperialism, solidarity and the unity among the Third World countries are also components of that policy (Ibid.).
Cuba’s foreign policy adheres to the basic principles of the international law: respect to the states’ sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity; peoples’ self-determination; the equality of states and peoples; rejection to the interference in the states’ internal affairs; the right to international cooperation, equitable and mutual; the pacific relations between the states, and other principles consecrated in the Letter of the United Nations (MRE-Cuba 2006, par. 1). Thus, peacekeeping is seen as interference in a state’s internal affairs. The internationalism, the anti-imperialism, solidarity and the unity among the Third World countries are also components of that policy (Ibid.).
Cuba condemns all hegemonic, interference and discriminatory practice in international relations (Ibid., par. 3). It also rejects the threat or use of force, the adoption of coercive unilateral measures, the aggression and any form of terrorism, including the terrorism of state (Ibid.). The Cuban Republic’s Constitution condemns any type of race, creed or opinion discrimination (Ibid.).
Cuba’s strengthening ties with China and Venezuela, which have provided major economic stimulus, seem set to become more important, assuming that the governments of those two countries remain in place (EIU 2006bi, 7). This makes Cuba’s official relations with other Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries less significant, encouraging its rejection of political conditions, such as those imposed by the EU (Ibid.). Cuba will continue actively to build relations with other countries in the Americas and the wider developing world (Ibid.).
Additional variables found after the preliminary analysis:
Climate changes
No record.
Independent negotiations taken by DPKO to seek troops
No record.
Independent negotiations taken by contributor countries to engage non-contributor countries
No record.
Meetings organized by other international organizations to engage in dialogue about peacekeeping
No record.
